TY - JOUR
T1 - Research on the complex features about Stackelberg game model with retailers have dualidentities
AU - Liu Geng
JO - Journal of Information and Computing Science
VL - 2
SP - 100
EP - 116
PY - 2024
DA - 2024/01
SN - 13
DO - http://doi.org/
UR - https://global-sci.org/intro/article_detail/jics/22452.html
KW - bounded rationality, game theory, complex analysis,bifurcation. 

AB - (Received January 18 2018, accepted March 11 2018) 
This paper presents a 1-2 suppliers-retailers model with delayed bounded rationality. The retailers have 
their own products, and their products aren’t manufacturer’s products’ substitutes, products are epiphytic relation-
ship. The phenomenon of chaos and other complex phenomena are reported using stability region,bifu1rca-
tion,attractors etc. We also introduce delayed decision into the model, study the influence of delayed decision on the 
stability of the model. The results show that the system’s stability is mainly determined by the delay coefficient, ap-
propriate delay coefficient can enhance the stability of the system, the inappropriate delay coefficient will reduce the 
stability of the system. In addition, we cannot simply think that more merchants adopt delayed decision can improve 
the stability of the system.