TY - JOUR
T1 - Incentive Effects of Multiple-Server Queueing Networks: The Principal-Agent Perspective
AU - Sin-Man Choi, Ximin Huang, Wai-Ki Ching & Min Huang
JO - East Asian Journal on Applied Mathematics
VL - 4
SP - 379
EP - 402
PY - 2018
DA - 2018/02
SN - 1
DO - http://doi.org/10.4208/eajam.231010.260711a
UR - https://global-sci.org/intro/article_detail/eajam/10911.html
KW - Capacity allocation, competition, incentive theory,  Markovian queueing systems, Nash equilibrium, principal agent.
AB - <p style="text-align: justify;">A two-server service network has been studied from the principal-agent
perspective. In the model, services are rendered by two independent facilities coordinated
by an agency, which seeks to devise a strategy to suitably allocate customers
to the facilities and to simultaneously determine compensation levels. Two possible
allocation schemes were compared — viz. the common queue and separate queue
schemes. The separate queue allocation scheme was shown to give more competition
incentives to the independent facilities and to also induce higher service capacity.
In this paper, we investigate the general case of a multiple-server queueing
model, and again find that the separate queue allocation scheme creates more competition
incentives for servers and induces higher service capacities. In particular,
if there are no severe diseconomies associated with increasing service capacity, it
gives a lower expected sojourn time in equilibrium when the compensation level is
sufficiently high.</p>